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PART I: NATIONAL FEDERATION OF INDEPENDENT BUSINESS 





All eyes were on the Supreme Court this summer as the Court pre-
pared to decide an important decision during a contentious election year. 
The case was National Federation of Independent Business et al. v. 
Sebelius, and it decided the constitutionality of the 2010 Patient Protec-
tion and Affordable Care Act (PPACA).
2
 PPACA was challenged as un-
constitutional by twenty-six states. The Court’s majority opinion, deliv-
ered by Chief Justice John Roberts, focused on two key parts of the Act: 
the individual mandate and the Medicare expansion. Below is a summary 
of the majority opinion.  
A. PPACA’S “INDIVIDUAL MANDATE” IS NOT CONSTITUTIONAL UNDER 
THE COMMERCE CLAUSE BUT IS CONSTITUTIONAL UNDER CONGRESS’S 
TAXING POWER.  
Chief Justice John Roberts delivered the majority opinion, joined by 
Justices Ruth Bader Ginsberg, Stephen Breyer, Sonia Sotomayor, and 
Elena Kagan. Roberts started by reiterating the mission of the Court: to 
simply decide whether Congress has the power under the Constitution to 
enact the challenged provisions. He discussed the Court’s limited role of 
policing the boundaries while not considering whether the Act has sound 
policies. He stated that the “Court [is] vested with the authority to inter-
pret the law; we possess neither the expertise nor the prerogative to make 
policy judgments.”
3
 It is the sole responsibility of the Court to enforce 
the limits of federal power to those defined and enumerated within the 
Constitution and to strike down those acts that “transgress those limits.”
4
 
First, Roberts examined whether the Court had standing to hear the 
case. Under the Anti-Injunction Act,
5
 suits that try to restrain the assess-
ment or collection of any tax are barred. To prevent disruption to the 
“stream of revenue,” the Anti-Injunction Act requires that individuals 
first pay the tax and then challenge the tax for a refund. Congress, how-
  
 1. J.D. 2012, University of Denver Sturm College of Law. This is the first part in a multi-
part series on the healthcare decision. This part focuses on the majority opinion. The next part will 
focus on the concurring and dissenting opinions.  
 2. 26 U.S.C. § 5000A (the section at issue is the so-called “individual mandate.”).  
 3. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. et al. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. __,*6 (2012).  
 4. Id. at *6.  
 5. 26 U.S.C. § 7421(a) provides, “no suit for the purpose of restraining the assessment or 
collection of any tax shall be maintained in any court by any person.” 
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ever, did not refer to the payments under this Act as a “tax” but as a 
“shared responsibility payment”
6
 or a “penalty” for those who refused to 
obtain health insurance. The Government argued, and the Court agreed, 
that PPACA’s statutory language directing the Secretary of the Treasury 
to use the same tools he uses to collect taxes to collect this “penalty” was 
not a mandate for the courts to apply the Anti-Injunction Act. This lan-
guage was to be used by the Secretary as merely a guide on how to col-
lect the penalty. Therefore, because PPACA’s statutory language did not 
mandate that the penalty be treated as a tax for the purposes of the Anti-
Injunction Act, the suit was not barred, and the Court had standing to 
decide the substantive issues presented.  
The Court addressed the Government’s first argument that the indi-
vidual mandate was constitutional under the Commerce Clause and then 
addressed the Government’s second argument that, alternatively, the 
individual mandate was constitutional under Congress’s Taxing Power.  
i. Avoiding the “impetuous vortex”: Congress does not have the power 
under the Commerce Clause to compel individuals to become en-
gaged in interstate activity.  
The Government argued that the individual mandate was constitu-
tional under Congress’s Commerce Clause power. Congress was faced 
with an expensive cost-shifting issue: hospitals under certain state and 
federal laws are required to provide care regardless of the patient’s abil-
ity to pay. This results in uninsured patients receiving care that they can-
not pay for. This cost is passed on to the insurers in the form of higher 
rates. The insurers then pass the costs to the insured in the form of higher 
premiums. Congress estimated that care for uninsured patients “raises 
family health insurance premiums, on average, by over $1,000 per 
year.”
7
 Insurance companies, in addition, are reluctant to add to their 
burden by insuring those individuals most in need of health insurance, 
those with preexisting conditions. The result is individuals go uninsured 
and seek medical treatment that they cannot afford, which ultimately 
increases the burden on the system as a whole by contributing to higher 
rates for all.  
Congress created PPACA’s individual mandate as a cure to these is-
sues. First, Congress required that insurance companies insure those with 
preexisting conditions. Then Congress mandated a certain level of care in 
the form of minimum essential insurance coverage. This is a very expen-
sive proposition: insure more people and provide more benefits to those 
people. These goals can only be accomplished by requiring healthy indi-
viduals, who do not normally seek health insurance, to pay into the sys-
tem as well. This is where the individual mandate comes into play. The 
  
 6. 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(b)(1) refers to the penalty as the “shared responsibility payment.” 
 7. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 567 U.S. __,*16. 
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individual mandate requires that individuals without insurance either get 
insurance or pay a penalty. This extra infusion of income, from presuma-
bly healthier people who use fewer benefits, allows the insurance com-
panies to afford to cover more benefits for more people. 
Roberts pointed out that “Congress has never attempted to rely [on 
the Commerce Clause] to compel individuals not engaged in commerce 
to purchase an unwanted product.”
8
 Examining the Commerce Clause, he 
stated that the Commerce Clause empowers Congress to “regulate Com-
merce” under Article I, Section 8, clause 3. There is no mention of the 
power to create commerce. Roberts argued that the term “regulate” does 
not equate to the term “create.” He pointed to some of Congress’s other 
powers to support this distinction. For instance, Congress has the power 
to coin money (to create) and the power to regulate the value thereof (to 
regulate); both the power to create and regulate are conferred by the 
Constitution. Here, the individual mandate does not regulate but seeks to 




Roberts refused to permit Congress to construe the Commerce 
Clause in this manner. Doing so would grant Congress powers that are 
“new and potentially vast”
10
 and allow Congress to draw all activities 
into the Commerce Clause’s domain and its “impetuous vortex.”
11
 
Because Roberts dismissed the Commerce Clause argument, the 
Necessary and Proper Clause argument failed as well. The Necessary and 
Proper Clause, granting Congress the power to “make all Laws which 
shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution”
12
 its enumer-
ated powers, does not carry any substantive and independent powers of 
its own. It can only properly work in conjunction with a valid enumerat-
ed action by Congress. Here, Congress’s actions under the Commerce 
Clause were improper and could not be saved solely by the Necessary 
and Proper Clause.  
ii. The individual mandate lives another day: Congress has the power 
under the Taxing Power to tax individuals who forgo health insur-
ance.  
Roberts next turned to the Government’s argument that the individ-
ual mandate merely imposes a tax on individuals who forgo health insur-
ance, a valid use of the federal government’s taxing power to “lay and 
collect Taxes.”
13
 Borrowing from the language of Justices Joseph Story 
  
 8. Id. at *18. 
 9. Id. at *20 (emphasis in original).  
 10. Id. at *20 
 11. Id. at *23.  
 12. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.  
 13. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. 
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and Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Roberts acknowledged the doctrine of 
constitutional avoidance. Under this doctrine, when a statute has more 
than one possible, reasonable meaning, courts in their role of interpreting 
the laws should adopt the meaning that does not violate the constitution 
in order to save a statute from unconstitutionally.  
PPACA’s plain language commands individuals to purchase insur-
ance. Interpreting the individual mandate as a command under the Com-
merce Clause is invalid, according to Roberts Congress cannot compel 
individuals to become engaged in commerce by purchasing a product. 
This reading of the Act is unconstitutional. However, Roberts pointed out 
that the Government’s second argument, that this was a tax and valid 
under Congress’s taxing power, is a reasonable interpretation of the 
Act.
14
 Under the doctrine of constitutional avoidance, this reasonable 
reading of the Act would save the act. 
Roberts instead turned to the substance and application of the “share 
responsibility payment” to determine the correct interpretation. Using a 
three-part functional approach found in Bailey v. Drexel Furniture,
15
 the 
Court examined whether the tax or exaction: (1) imposed an exceedingly 
heavy burden for a small infraction; (2) had a scienter requirement typi-
cally found in punitive statutes as a punishment; and (3) was enforced by 
an agency responsible for punishing violations rather than collecting 
revenue.
16
 For example, in Drexel Furniture, the company employed 
children. Congress passed a statute that provided a 10% “tax” on the 
company’s net income for hiring even one child (an exceedingly heavy 
burden); this tax only applied to those who knowingly employed children 
(scienter); and the tax was collected by the Department of Labor (not a 
revenue collecting agency).
17
 The Court found that this was not a tax and 
was not authorized under Congress’s taxing power.  
  
 14. While a label of a “tax” in the statutory language would require the Anti-Injunction Act to 
come into play, the Court was not constrained by that label. The Court has previously sustained 
“surcharges” as a tax despite the statutory designation. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 
171 (1992) (“[T]he Secretary's collection of a percentage of the surcharge, is no more than a federal 
tax on interstate commerce, which petitioners do not claim to be an invalid exercise of either 
Congress' commerce or taxing power.”). The Court has also sustained “licensee fees” as a tax under 
the License Tax Cases, 72 U.S. (1 Wall.) 462, 471 (1866) (“The granting of a license, therefore, 
must be regarded as nothing more than a mere form of imposing a tax, and of implying nothing 
except that the licensee shall be subject to no penalties under national law, if he pays it.”).  
 
 
 15. Bailey v. Drexel Furniture, 259 U.S. 20, 38 (1922) (“The difference between a tax and a 
penalty is sometimes difficult to define, and yet the consequences of the distinction in the required 
method of their collection often are important. Where the sovereign enacting the law has power to 
impose both tax and penalty, the difference between revenue production and mere regulation may be 
immaterial, but not so when one sovereign can impose a tax only, and the power of regulation rests 
in another.” Id.).  
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. 
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Turning to the individual mandate, the amount due under PPACA’s 
penalty is not an exceedingly heavy burden as the penalty will be less 
than the price of insurance as set by statute. Second, the penalty does not 
contain scienter requirement. Finally, the payment is collected by the 
Internal Revenue Service (IRS), but the IRS is statutorily prohibited from 
imposing any form of criminal sanctions for failing to pay this penalty.  
Under this three-part functional approach, according to Roberts, this 
“penalty” can reasonably and properly be called a tax.
18
  
Roberts turned again to the reason he rejected the Government’s 
Commerce Clause argument: inactivity. He stated, “If it is troubling to 
interpret the Commerce Clause as authorizing Congress to regulate those 
who abstain from commerce, perhaps it should be similarly troubling to 
permit Congress to impose a tax for not doing something.”
19
  
He answered this concern in three parts. First, the Constitution does 
not provide any guarantees that the federal government cannot tax inac-
tivity, while the Commerce Clause protects individuals from regulation if 
the individuals choose not to engage in the regulated activity. Second, 
the Courts have placed limits on Congress’s taxing power. As discussed 
above, Congress’s use of the taxing power as a punitive measure exceeds 
Congress’s authority under the taxing power. That is not the case here. 
Third, the taxing power and power to regulate commerce have different 
limits. When Congress regulates commerce under the Commerce Clause, 
it can “bring its full weight to bear.”
20
 This means Congress has to full 
power to regulate that behavior, including all criminal sanctions. Here, 
Congress limited the power exercised under PPACA to merely paying 
the penalty. Congress expressly limited the Secretary of Treasury’s pow-
er to collect the penalty, not authorizing any criminal sanctions or fines 
for nonpayment.  
Roberts concluded by simply stating, “[PPACA’s] requirement that 
certain individuals pay a financial penalty for not obtaining health insur-
ance may reasonably be characterized as a tax. Because the Constitution 




B. “A GUN TO THE HEAD”: MEDICARE EXPANSION CONDITIONS CROSS 
THE LINE FROM PERSUASION TO COERCION.  
Roberts next addressed the concern over the Government’s use of 
the Spending Clause to coerce the States into expanding their Medicaid 
coverage. Generally, Congress has the power under the Spending Clause 
  
 18. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 567 U.S. __,*36. 
 19. Id. at *41. 
 20. Id. at *43. 
 21. Id. at *44. 
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The Court has previously limited this power to respect the inde-
pendent sovereignty of the states under the federal system. Therefore, it 
is well-settled that Congress is prohibited from “commandeering” a State 
government for its own federal purposes. Borrowing from contract law, 
the Court has held that commandeering can take the form of undue influ-
ence.
23
 The State has the sovereign right to enter into a contract with the 
federal government to accept funds for the general welfare, and the fed-
eral government can place conditions on those funds. However, the State 
has the right to enter into the contract “voluntarily and knowingly.”
24
 
Additionally, the federal government can use incentives to achieve feder-
al goals, but, as Roberts pointed out, “when pressure turns into compul-
sion, the legislation runs contrary to our system of federalism.”
25
 
Turning to the Medicaid expansion, Roberts asked whether the fi-
nancial inducement offered by Congress was so coercive as to cross the 
line from pressure or incentives into compulsion. Under PPACA, the 
section at issue was Section 1396c,
26
 which provided that if a state’s 
Medicaid plan does not comply with the new PPACA requirements, the 
Secretary of Health and Human Services may cease to provide any fur-
ther payments to the noncomplying state. The States are required to go 
from covering certain individuals—pregnant women, children, needy 
families, elderly, and the disabled—to providing “essential health bene-
fits” packages to all individuals under 65-years-old who fall below 133 
percent of the federal poverty line.
27
 
PPACA provides that the funding for new recipients will initially be 
paid the federal government, decreasing to a minimum funding level of 
90 percent.
28
 The issue is that noncomplying states will not only lose this 
additional funding for noncompliance but will also lose all existing Med-
icaid funding for noncompliance. Roberts said that “the financial ‘in-
ducement’ Congress has chosen is much more than ‘relatively mild en-
couragement’—it is a gun to the head.”
29
 This “economic dragooning” 
  
 22. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. 
 23. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 567 U.S. __,*47 (citing Printz v. U.S., 521 U.S. 898, 933 
1997). 
 24. Id.  
 25. Id. When the federal government requires the State to implement programs that achieve a 
federal program, it creates an accountability issue. Namely, the State officials will bear the brunt of 
public disapproval while federal officials “remain insulated from the electoral ramifications of their 
decision.” Id. at *48. 
 26. 42 U.S.C. § 1396c.  
 27. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 567 U.S. __,*45-46. 
 28. Id. at *46. 
 29. Id. at *51. Medicaid funding is an estimated 20 percent of the average State budget with 
the federal government covering 50 to 83 percent of these costs depending on the state. Id. 
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leaves the States with no real options and is the epitome of coercion by 
the federal government.  
The Government also argued that the States agreed to any amend-
ments to Medicaid when they originally accepted the Medicaid program. 
The original Medicaid provisions, after all, granted the Government the 
right to “alter, amend, or repeal” any provision.
30
 Roberts acknowledged 
this power but stated that the statute contemplates a right to make ad-
justments as the program grew. However, Roberts pointed out, this alter-
ation changes the program from one that provides for specifically needy 
groups to one that will provide for the “entire nonelderly population with 
income below 133 percent of the poverty level,”
31
 creating a universal 
health insurance coverage under the existing Medicaid structure.  
Robert struck down the provision allowing the Secretary to with-
draw existing Medicaid funds for any noncomplying state. The States 
are, therefore, free to reject the Medicaid expansion requirements with-
out fear of losing the entirety of the State Medicaid funding. 
Roberts, striving to stay within the Constitutional limits of the 
Court’s power, turned to Congress’s intent on whether striking the of-
fending provision required the Court to invalidate the entire Act. He stat-
ed that holding does not affect the continued application of the existing 
provisions and that merely limiting the financial pressure from the Medi-
caid expansion section brings PPACA into Constitutional compliance.  
In sum, the majority of the Court was persuaded by the Govern-
ment’s argument that the individual mandate was a valid use of Con-
gresses Commerce Clause power. Roberts stated that this argument fails 
because Congress has the power to regulate commerce, not to create 
commerce.  However, the individual mandate was saved by the Govern-
ment’s second argument; the individual mandate can reasonably be in-
terpreted as a tax. Next, Roberts struck down the conditions Congress 
placed in the Medicaid expansion funds, saying Congress unconstitution-
ally crossed the line. Instead of creating incentives to comply with the 
program, Congress’s coercive “all or nothing” proposition left the States 
with no real options. The Medicaid expansion conditions were severable 




 30. 42 U.S.C. § 1304.  
 31. Id. at *53. 
 32. Part II of this article will address the concurring and the dissenting opinions.  
